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Paul Irvine, Paul J. Simko, and Siva Nathan ull-service brokerage firms typically engage in investment banking, broker/ dealer services, and fundamental research. The activities of brokerage firms' research departments are ostensibly independent of other operations, but the evidence is clear that relationships exist among departments. The influence of lucrative corporate finance relationships on sellside analysts' opinions has been particularly well documented in both academic studies and the business press (Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lowenstein 1996; Lin and McNichols 1998; Laderman 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999) . Recent lawsuits in Massachusetts (Craig 2002) and New York (Beck 2002; Silverman 2002 ) support the notion that relationships between sell-side research and other brokerage firm departments adversely influence research quality. Although the business press recognizes that investment banking is not the only potential source of conflict for sell-side analysts (Sidel and Craig 2002; Opdyke 2002) , commentary related to the investment banking litigation has been particularly negative:
When internal communications reveal Merrill Lynch research analysts disparaging the very stocks they are recommending to millions of hard-working families seeking guidance on how to invest their life savings and their children's college funds, we must ask: do their investment recommendations serve the investors to whom they owe a duty of loyalty and honesty or their investment banking clients. (Spitzer 2002) What is frequently not made clear in this debate is that positive externalities (positive effects) can come from bundling different functions within a full-service broker. An example is in-house asset management, which produces considerable demand for high-quality financial information within the brokerage firm. Asset management has been one of the fastest growing areas in financial service, with many brokerage firms participating through the development of mutual fund-based asset management departments.
1 To meet these departments' demands for information, the buy side can generate information internally-from its own buy-side analysts and portfolio managers-or obtain it externally from sell-side analysts. This situation raises several questions. its own broker's affiliated sell-side research departments? Does the potential for pooling information from the research and asset management departments have meaningful implications for sell-side analysts' forecasts or for the actions of their affiliated asset management departments?
Although communication between affiliated buy-side and sell-side analysts is not explicitly prohibited in the Investment Company Act of 1940, we found that practitioners were divided on whether the buy side and the sell side within the same firm share information. Conversations with buy-side and sell-side analysts at several full-service brokerage firms revealed polarized opinions. Some claimed that such communication was rare or nonexistent; others suggested that it is a common activity on the Street. To determine whether the firms themselves had made any explicit references to intrafirm communication, we examined N-SAR item 20, which lists the top 10 soft dollar brokers for each fund. The N-SAR filings did not provide a definitive answer. For example, the Dean Witter Mid-Cap Growth Fund's January 1995 N-SAR lists Dean Witter as the primary supplier of soft dollar services but the Smith Barney Aggressive Growth Fund April 1995 N-SAR does not include Smith Barney among the fund's top-10 soft dollar brokers. Our conclusion was that whether intrafirm communication has any important effects is essentially an open empirical question.
The study reported here evaluated this issue by examining the association between two variables that capture the information environments of asset management and research-the asset management department's level of stock ownership and the earnings forecast accuracy of affiliated sellside analysts.
In contrast to the generally negative commentary surrounding the influence of the corporate finance department on sell-side research, we hypothesized that bundling asset management and research might be benign or even beneficial for the quality of both the sell-side analysts' forecasts and the fund managers' investments. These benefits could arise in two ways. First, fund managers might closely examine stocks for which their affiliated sellside analysts have particular expertise relative to other analysts. Such expertise-arising from analyst talent, experience, or effort or from differences in resources among brokerage firms-would provide a compelling reason for asset managers to follow these analysts' views. Second, a manager's fiduciary and performance incentives motivate them to closely monitor stocks that are particularly important to the performance of the manager's portfolio. Given sell-side analysts incentives to gather information about the stocks they cover, if the asset management department of the analyst's own firm owns a large position in a stock, then that department is a clear source of information on that stock. Affiliated sell-side analysts would thus also have incentives to increase their focus on securities that constitute a significant share of the fund manager's investments (Sidel and Craig) .
We predicted that if a brokerage firm's sell-side analysts gather high-quality information about stocks owned by their affiliated asset management departments, either directly from their own expertise or indirectly from buy-side analysts and portfolio managers, then that affiliated analysts' earnings forecasts on these stocks will be more accurate than those of a control group of unaffiliated analysts. Furthermore, we hypothesized that affiliated analysts' forecast accuracy, relative to that of unaffiliated analysts, increases in relation to the significance of the fund's investment.
To test our predictions, we studied new security purchases by the mutual fund families of 17 full-service brokerage firms in the years 1994-2001. We examined purchases because we posited that they would provide an unambiguous positive signal about the information environment within the fund family by showing that the portfolio managers were sufficiently confident in these stocks to add them to the fund family's portfolios.
Data and Methodology
Our empirical analysis required data of two typesdetailed portfolio data for mutual funds' stock holdings and affiliated and unaffiliated sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts for these same securities. The objective of our sampling procedure was to identify a comprehensive sample of securities with data available from both sources.
We first identified a sample of full-service brokerage firms with both a research and a mutual fund-based asset management department. Information on these firms' portfolio compositions was then obtained from Morningstar's OnDisc database. Analysts' earnings forecast data were obtained from I/B/E/S.
Identification of Mutual Fund Family. From the 1994-95 Nelson's Directory of Investment
Research, we identified 310 U.S.-based brokerage firms that provided security research services in the sample period. We then matched these firms to the mutual fund ownership information in the Morningstar Report on Equity Mutual Funds for 1991-1995. Thirty-five brokerage firms had fund data available in Morningstar, and seventeen of these firms also had earnings forecasts available on I/B/E/S for the study period. These 17 firms constitute our sample of mutual fund families owned by full-service brokerages. 2 Morningstar collects mutual fund information from the N-SAR form mandated by the U.S. SEC. The semiannual N-SAR filing includes information on trades, 12b-1 fees, portfolio turnover rates, sales charges, and selected financial information. Every six months, in April and October, Morningstar summarizes the mutual fund stock ownership data from the N-SAR forms in its OnDisc database. We used the N-SAR filing in lieu of other SEC-mandated forms because it has the advantage of being the most inclusive and comprehensive filing available.
3 Our sample of mutual fund stock holdings was gathered from the October 1994 through October 2001 OnDisc reporting periods (i.e., 15 total periods). We ended the Morningstar data collection in 2001 because, as discussed later, to measure analyst accuracy, we needed to allow significant time for companies to report actual EPS.
For each OnDisc reporting period, we determined the individual funds managed by the 17 full-service brokers in our sample. For these funds, we collected the net asset value (NAV), identified the individual securities held by each fund, and calculated the market value of each equity security held by the fund. We excluded from our analysis any fund that did not hold U.S. equities (e.g., a bond fund).
Identification of Fund Family's Security
Investments. We focused on stock ownership at the fund-family level, as opposed to the individualfund level, because the fund-family level best reveals the aggregate importance of the ownership position to the asset management department. Furthermore, we used only purchases of new securities because we expected them to represent an unambiguous positive signal from the fund manager.
For each security, we computed the NAV weight of the holding as a percentage of all fund holdings (NAVWGHT) and the percentage of stock owned by the fund family (%OWN). Specifically, NAVWGHT for a fund family's portfolio was measured (for each semiannual Morningstar report period t) as the summed market value of security i across all k funds, f, for each fund family F. Scaling by the fund family's total NAV yielded the fundfamily allocation attributable to security i:
where MV is market value, defined as price per common share multiplied by total common shares outstanding.
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The variable %OWN was calculated as the total common shares held by the fund family as of the end of the OnDisc reporting period divided by the total common shares outstanding:
(2) Ideally, we would like to have identified the specific date on which the investment by a fund actually took place. Unfortunately, pinpointing this date was not possible because funds report only semiannual holdings and funds within a family have different semiannual report dates. For instance, for a fund whose semiannual reporting period ends 30 November, an actual trade inferred from comparing the 31 May and 30 November portfolio holdings may have occurred as early as 1 June or as late as 30 November.
Because information can flow from the analyst to the portfolio manager or from the portfolio manager to the analyst, we examined earnings forecasts both before and after the dates at which we could unequivocally state that ownership existed. (In the aforementioned example, the dates would be 1 June and 30 November.) Table 1 presents descriptive data for selected characteristics of the 17 fund families in the sample. For each fund family, Table 1 presents the average number of funds and net assets under management over all Morningstar reporting periods. (All fund families were represented in multiple periods, but only the large families had the requisite data for the full 15 reporting periods.) For example, Merrill Lynch is the largest fund family in the sample, with an average $35 billion under management in an average of 74 funds in the sample period. The size and total investments for these families vary considerably. The last columns of Table 1 report the composition of the sample used in the empirical tests. Specifically, we gathered analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S for periods before and after a fund family's new security purchase. The larger fund families tend to have more observations in the final sample, but no single family dominates.
An interesting conclusion that can be readily inferred from the data in the last columns is that sell-side analysts have a tendency to initiate coverage of a stock after purchase of the stock by the affiliated portfolio manager. This conclusion is reflected in a 57 percent increase in the afterpurchase sample size from the before-purchase sample size. 6
Estimation of Analysts' Relative Accuracy. We gathered earnings forecasts and EPS data from I/B/E/S. To be included in the sample, a security had to (1) be actively followed by at least three unaffiliated analysts during the quarter immediately before or immediately after the end of the OnDisc reporting period, (2) have two-year-ahead earnings forecasts available for both the affiliated analyst and a control group of unaffiliated analysts, and (3) have actual EPS data available for each earnings forecast. We imposed these criteria because our tests relied on measures of relative forecast accuracy. The benchmark against which we evaluated the level of an affiliated analyst's earnings forecast was a control sample of analysts without direct affiliation with the fund family.
The first criterion (at least three unaffiliated analysts) provides a reasonable comparison by mitigating the influence of outliers that may arise solely because a security is infrequently followed. 7 The second sampling criterion (two-year-ahead earnings forecasts) arose from the nature of the presumed investment horizon of mutual fund managers. Given restrictions on short-term trading activities during our study period, we reasonably assumed that the mutual fund manager's private information and investment horizon probably pertained to a time period beyond the current fiscal year of the company.
8 Our final requirement (that actual EPS data be available) was necessary if we were to compute relative forecast accuracy. This criterion restricted our sampling period to no later than October 2001.
Although our main focus was on the relationship between sell-side analyst accuracy and a fund family's investments, our initial tests also examined forecast optimism of in-house analysts relative to a control group of unaffiliated analysts. McNichols and O'Brien (1997) defined earnings forecast relative optimism as the difference between an observed forecast and a relevant benchmark. We adopted this approach by specifically measuring affiliated analysts' relative optimism, OPTM, as 
where is a two-year-ahead earnings forecast by an affiliated analyst of fund family F for security i, with date t as the earliest date in the quarter after the end of the OnDisc reporting period. Superscript UNAFF indicates the most recent forecast made by an unaffiliated analyst within ±30 days of the affiliated analyst's forecast. 9 We scaled the numerator by the standard deviation of all forecasts for security i to control for cross-sectional variation in the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. 10 Next, we examined relative forecast accuracy, a measure distinct from optimism, in that "accuracy" captures the quality of forecasts made by the affiliated analyst whereas "optimism" reflects any potential bias in the forecast. We defined relative accuracy for security i, ACCUR i , as the difference in standardized unaffiliated and affiliated analyst forecast errors (forecasted EPS less actual EPS) scaled by their respective standard deviations:
Table 2 summarizes the pooled distributions of the components of OPTM and ACCUR partitioned by whether the affiliated analyst forecast was measured before or after the fund purchase. The mean forecasts of affiliated analysts are generally comparable to the group of unaffiliated forecasts (FORE UNAFF ), although the affiliated analysts' forecast is higher at both the mean and median. Both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' forecasts are, on average, approximately 20 percent larger than actual reported EPS, indicating that the previously documented phenomenon of forecast optimism exists in all our sample analysts. Table 2 also summarizes the NAV weight of the stock holding as a percentage of all fund holdings, the percentage of stock owned by the fund family, the market value of common equity (in millions), and number of analysts following the stock (NUMEST).
11 The distribution of NAVWGHT, because its median is less than 1/10 of 1 percent, shows that managers are not committing a significant portion of fund assets to new investments. Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on the distribution of relative optimism and relative accuracy partitioned by whether the forecast occurred before or after fund purchase. We did not find widespread evidence that the distributions of affiliated analyst forecasts are significantly different from those of unaffiliated analysts; relative optimism and relative accuracy before and after fund purchase have medians of zero. A difference-inmeans test indicated that the optimism of affiliated analyst forecasts was significantly higher than the optimism of unaffiliated analysts before (t = 3.74) and after (t = 1.86) the new investment, but these results were not confirmed for the period after the investment by a nonparametric sign-rank test. Notes: Variables measured before fund purchase relate I/B/E/S analyst forecast data gathered during the quarter preceding the fund family's N-SAR reporting date. Variables measured after fund purchase are for those measured as of the end of the reporting period or, in the case of forecast data, during the quarter immediately after the reporting period. NUMEST = number of analysts following the security. ©2004, AIMR ® Consistent with the descriptive evidence in Table 2 , Table 3 shows that relative accuracy deteriorated slightly after the fund purchased the stock; affiliated analysts initiating coverage after the fund's purchase forecasted somewhat worse, on average, than affiliated analysts who covered the firm prior to the fund's purchase. As a whole, at this full-sample univariate level, the only inference that is consistent from parametric and nonparametric tests at conventional significance levels is that affiliated analysts are more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts before fund purchase.
In the analysis of the tests that follow, we explore whether conditioning on the analyst fund family's percentage ownership of the stock affects the relative accuracy of affiliated analysts' forecasts.
Ownership Level and Relative Forecast Accuracy
We report our main results in two stages. We first examine the cross-sectional association between the relative accuracy of affiliated analysts' forecasts and the fund family's ownership level in the stock. We then estimate multivariate regression models that control for other factors that could affect the relationship between accuracy and ownership. After establishing these main results, we provide a summary of robustness checks.
Relative Forecast Optimism and Accuracy Conditional on Ownership. Our primary empirical tests examined whether affiliated analysts' forecasts exhibit a systematic association with the fund family's percentage ownership of a stock (%OWN). Our preliminary examination of this issue involved the use of portfolios. We formed 10 portfolios by ranking all observations based on the values of %OWN, then examined the coincident values of affiliated analyst relative accuracy for each of these deciles.
Our primary focus was on the quality of affiliated analyst output as reflected by relative accuracy, but we also included relative optimism for comparison. In this analysis, relative optimism and accuracy in the ownership deciles are reported as the percentage of affiliated forecasts that were above the samplewide median of the respective metric. Thus, under the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between affiliated forecasts and percentage ownership, relatively optimistic (%OPTM) and relatively accurate (%ACCUR) forecasts in any given decile is an expected 50 percent. Note that, by construction, when affiliated forecasts are more accurate for one portfolio, they must be, on average, less accurate for another. Table 4 presents relative accuracy and relative optimism by ownership decile for forecasts made after the fund family purchased the stocks. The results are striking. We found no consistent pattern between relative optimism and percentage ownership, but the percentage of more-accurate affiliated analysts' forecasts rises dramatically to 61.5 percent in the 10th decile of security ownership. A likelihood ratio test appropriate for percentages (Greene 1997, p. 886) indicates that the χ 2 statistic against the null of no difference in forecast accuracy is 21.50 (p-value < 0.01). Although we found that the higher the percentage ownership, the more accurate the affiliated analysts' forecast, we found for the entire sample little systematic relationship between ownership and accuracy; we observed no other significant test statistics across ownership deciles. Table 4 . It is readily apparent that the top decile of %OWN, where ownership approached 1 percent of the companies' shares outstanding (see Table 2 ), yielded the highest percentage of relatively superior forecasts, with a monotonic increase observable beginning in Decile 8. Taken together, the results reported in Table 4 are consistent with the overall distribution of optimism and accuracy presented in Table 3 : No samplewide differences are apparent between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts for most deciles.
Untabulated results indicate a similar distribution in relative accuracy before fund purchase, with 60.9 percent of affiliated analysts more accurate than their peers in the largest decile of percentage ownership. Thus, fund managers are making the largest new investments in the stocks for which their affiliated analysts appear to have the highest quality information, as measured by accuracy of their earnings forecasts before fund purchase. Table 4 support our hypothesis that affiliated analyst forecast accuracy is related to percentage ownership. The tests in Table 4 did not control for other factors, however, that could have an impact on relative accuracy. To evaluate the robustness of our conclusions, we conducted two regression analyses. The specification of each model depended on whether we were examining forecasts made before or after the new investment. The regressions differ because we expected that the direction of influence would differ between the two periods. We expected asset managers before purchase to be more inclined to use information from affiliated sell-side analysts that they believed was relatively more accurate. We expected affiliated sell-side forecasts after purchase to benefit from the externalities generated by the asset management ownership position. Thus, the models tested for two causal relationships between ownership level and relative accuracy-presented first for the after-purchase period when relative accuracy would depend on the asset manager's new investment position and presented second for the before-purchase period when ownership would depend on the quality of sell-side analyst information (measured by the forecast relative accuracy before fund purchase). We viewed these models as complementary, in that each was designed to evaluate the association between fund ownership and sell-side analyst output. The following regressions were estimated (security subscripts omitted): (5) and (6) where R(X) represents the standardized ranked value of variable X, ε t and υ t are residuals, and 16 fund family fixed-effects coefficients (FAM) were included to control for any potential effects across fund families. We specified Equations 5 and 6 as rank-transform regressions largely to overcome potential violations of the ordinary least-squares (OLS) linearity assumption in our data.
Multivariate Regression Analysis. T h e portfolio-based results presented in
12 The pri- . We expected the coefficient on %OWN t in Equation 5 to be positive because we believed that the direct and indirect channels of information on which the accuracy of the affiliated analyst's forecast relied would be stronger the greater the percentage of the stock owned by the fund. An alternative hypothesis for the results in Table 4 is that analysts exert greater effort in forecasting earnings for stocks that are important to their broker's asset management department. To control for this alternative, we included NAVWGHT, the net new investment's relative importance to the fund portfolio. We posited that the higher the NAV weight, the greater the incentive for the analyst to forecast accurately; therefore, we expected a positive coefficient on NAVWGHT. Because the dependent variable in the regression is the forecast accuracy of the affiliated analyst relative to that of an unaffiliated analyst following the same company, companyspecific variables affecting analyst forecast accuracy did not need to be included in the regression (see Clement 1999 ). Characteristics explaining cross-sectional differences in a stock's information environment, however, could be important controls. For this reason, we included the number of analysts forecasting earnings, NUMEST, and the market value of the firm, MV. In addition, we controlled for potential resource differences among fund families with the variable ASSETS, which represents total assets under management.
Equation 6 presents a model in which the level of ownership depends on the sell-side analyst. Our expectation here was that the coefficient on ACCUR t-1 , δ 1 , would be positive because asset managers are, on the margin, more likely to invest in securities in which the firm's sell-side analysts have revealed their expertise by producing moreaccurate forecasts than their competitors. As control variables in Equation 6, we included a ranked OPTM variable to control for the possibility that fund managers would invest in securities for which the firm's affiliated analysts had higher expectations than other analysts. We also included NUMEST, MV, and ASSETS, for control as noted in the preceding paragraph. Table 5 and Table 6 report the results from estimating restricted specifications and full specifications of, respectively, Equations 5 and 6. 13 The results shown in Table 5 reinforce our inferences from the portfolio analysis reported in Table 4 : Consistent with the general pattern of increasing accuracy in Table 4 , in the restricted regression, %OWN is positive and significant (γ 1 = 0.038, t = 2.60). In the unrestricted regression, these results
are even stronger. In other words, the more of a particular security the affiliated fund family owns, the more accurate the affiliated analyst forecasts are subsequent to the purchase. In the restricted regression, the slope coefficient on NAVWGHT is also positive and significant, indicating that larger stocks in the fund family are associated with accurate forecasts. This result is insignificant, however, in the unrestricted regression. Thus, the positive coefficient on NAVWGHT in the restricted regression appears to be explained by the fact that larger, heavily covered firms, which also tend to have a high NAVWGHT, tend to have higher relative forecast accuracy among their analysts. Also, all else being equal, larger fund families tend to be associated with more-accurate affiliated analysts.
In Table 6 , we document a significant positive relationship between ownership and the relative accuracy of affiliated analysts' forecasts before the fund purchase. The coefficient on relative accuracy is significantly positive in both the restricted and unrestricted regressions. This result is notably strong and potentially indicative that more-accurate forecasts (i.e., analyst expertise) influence fund managers to purchase larger positions.
Unlike the results for accuracy, the results for optimism are not robust to the inclusion of the control variables. Although significant in the restricted regression, optimism is insignificantly positive in the unrestricted regression. Not surprisingly, because %OWN represents funds committed to a particular stock, this variable is positively related to the size of the fund family and negatively related to market value and the number of analysts covering the stock. 14 Taken as a whole, the results in Tables 4, 5 , and 6 support our contention that a positive externality exists between fund managers' investment decisions and affiliated sell-side analysts' forecasts. Fund family percentage ownership of a company's stock, which measures incentives driving the buyside's information collection, is positively related to the relative accuracy of the fund family's affiliated sell-side analyst's forecasts-both before and after the initial fund investment. The relationship appears to be much stronger, however, when ownership is measured subsequent to the forecast. We infer from the regression results in Tables 5 and 6 that the greater the ownership in the stock and the relative accuracy of the affiliated analyst, the greater the overall information quality within the brokerage firm. Robustness Checks. We performed a number of (untabulated) robustness checks to ensure that the reported results are not an artifact of our research design. Our tests focused on whether relative forecast accuracy improves as ownership increases. We examined whether this result holds for forecast accuracy without netting out the control group of unaffiliated analysts. Replication of Equation 5 but with analyst absolute forecast errors used as the dependent variable yielded results consistent with those reported in Table 5 . Other alternative specifications were tested, including (1) computation of OPTM and ACCUR with the consensus forecast as an alternative deflator, (2) using the consensus forecast rather than a single unaffiliated forecast as the control, and (3) including reporting period intercepts in Equations 5 and 6. Each alternative research design produced inferences that were qualitatively the same as those reported here.
Finally, in an analysis of the 1995-96 subperiod, we tested whether reputation and investment banking relationships affected our results. Stickel (1992) showed that analysts who are members of the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team supply more-accurate forecasts than other analysts who follow the same company. Thus, we included as a control in the regression a variable, IIAA, if an affiliated analyst had All-American Research Team status during the 12-month window surrounding the forecast date. The slope coefficients on IIAA were positive, which is consistent with Stickel, but our results were not statistically significant.
The papers on the influence of investment banking on analyst activity cited in the introduction suggested that underwriting activity may bias analyst forecasts and reduce accuracy. We controlled for investment banking activity by including a dummy variable in the regression if the brokerage firm engaged in any investment banking activity, including underwriting stock issues and mergers and acquisition advisory services, on the stock in question in the year prior to a forecast. Overall, we found only 7 percent of the forecasts connected with investment banking activity in the SDC Platinum database provided by Thomson Financial. The investment banking dummy variable was not significant in any regression specification in the 1995-96 subperiod.
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Conclusion
We examined the relationship between holdings of mutual funds operated by full-service brokerage firms and the relative earnings forecast accuracy of the firms' affiliated sell-side analysts. The purpose was to provide evidence on the interaction between the asset management side and research department of a full-service firm. We measured information quality by using relative earnings forecast accuracy, defined as the difference in absolute earnings forecast errors between affiliated analysts and a control group of unaffiliated analysts. Relative accuracy captures differences in expertise from such sources as talent, experience, or effort or from differences in resources among brokerage firms.
Using this measure, we tested whether (1) portfolio managers tend to follow the advice of affiliated analysts who are relatively more accurate and (2) whether affiliated analyst forecast accuracy improves in relation to the percentage ownership of a security after the fund family invests in the stock.
We found that fund families' largest new investments are significantly associated with affiliated analysts' forecast accuracy before the fund purchase decision, with the relationship particularly strong when ownership is measured subsequent to the forecast. This finding suggests that managers can identify affiliated analysts that have demonstrated expertise in a particular stock and that, to some degree, they base their new investment decisions on their beliefs in these analysts' expertise. After the fund family's purchase of a new stock, affiliated analyst coverage increased and affiliated analyst forecast accuracy was significantly positively related to the percentage of the stock owned by the fund family.
Our findings contribute to ongoing research regarding the properties of analysts' earnings forecasts. We have documented that affiliated analysts' earnings forecasts vary from others in a predictable fashion and that these differences are related to the actions of affiliated asset management departments. In contrast to the research emphasizing the negative influence of underwriting on analysts' forecasts, our results suggest that positive externalities can exist between the different departments of a full-service brokerage firm.
The recent introduction of Regulation FD could have a significant impact on our results. On the one hand, if Regulation FD effectively curtails private communications between company managers and analysts, affiliated sell-side analysts may lose any informational advantage they obtain from communications with affiliated buy-side analysts or from access to managers that accrues to institutions that own large positions. On the other hand, because private communications with all, affiliated and unaffiliated, sell-side analysts could be restricted by Regulation FD, the presence of affiliated buy-side analysts examining the same stock could continue to help affiliated sell-side analysts to provide more-accurate forecasts. Preliminary analysis based on our post-FD (August 2000) sample suggests both effects are present. On the one hand, the relationship between affiliated forecast accuracy before the purchase and the size of the fund purchase is less positive than in the remaining sample, which suggests that portfolio managers could be relying less on affiliated analysts since Regulation FD was instituted. On the other hand, the relationship between ownership and accuracy after the fund purchase is more positive in the post-FD period, which suggests that affiliated analysts and portfolio managers may be effectively sharing more information now that both parties' access to management forecasts has been restricted. The long-run impact of Regulation FD on the relationships we have documented is an interesting topic for future research.
1. Throughout this article, the term "asset management" refers to mutual fund-based asset management. 2. In the sample period, I/B/E/S stopped collecting broker codes after mergers (e.g., Dean Witter or Salomon Brothers). We followed I/B/E/S when identifying active brokers. When a broker code was dropped by I/B/E/S, we retained the fund family in our sample but stopped any further collection of Morningstar data. 3. A limitation of the N-SAR form is that it provides only semiannual data for a given fund. Less inclusive but more frequently required by the SEC is Form 13-F, which must be filed quarterly by any institutional investment manager having equity assets under management greater than $100 million. In addition, Form 13-D must be filed within 10 days of any transaction that results in the fund beneficially owning more than 5 percent of the outstanding securities of any particular stock. 4. The variable k (the number of funds in a family) is time dependent because families frequently create new funds and delete existing funds. 5. Price and share data were gathered from CRSP. 6. Although our study involved only new investments, our predictions should also hold for the divestiture of a security by the asset manager. Empirically, we found that when an asset manager significantly decreases an investment in a security, about one-third of the affiliated analysts tend to drop coverage of that security. This finding is consistent with the results reported by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) , who found that when analysts have negative information about a stock, they tend to drop coverage of that stock rather than revise their earnings forecast downward or issue a sell recommendation. 7. Tightening this constraint so that five forecasts were required did not materially influence the results. 8. During most of our study period, tax law specified that if a fund desired to remain tax exempt, no more than 30 percent of the fund's net income could involve short-term trading activity. Violation of this requirement rendered all currentyear income taxable during that year.
9. Fewer than 3 percent of the unaffiliated analysts were "affiliated," in terms of purchases of new securities, with other brokerage firms at some time during the sample period. Elimination of these observations had no material effect on any inference we report. 10. For this calculation, we used all active unaffiliated analysts' forecasts released in the 30-day window centered on the affiliated analyst's forecast date. If the same analyst made multiple forecasts during the 30-day window, we kept in the distribution the earnings forecast made nearest, in absolute days, to the affiliated analyst's forecast. See Comiskey, Walkling, and Weeks (1987) and Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) for a discussion of standardized mean earnings forecasts. 11. The descriptive statistics for all variables for each OnDisc reporting period are similar to those reported in aggregate. 12. Rank transformation provides the ability to correct any nonlinearities in the data. Table 4 and Figure 1 show that the right tail of %OWN contains a clustering of more relatively accurate forecasts. In addition, very small deflators in the calculations of ACCUR and OPTM would lead to extreme observations. The estimation procedure used in rank-transform regressions is to replace the continuous variables with their corresponding ranks. Specifically, when there are n observations for a sample variable, a rank of 1 is assigned to the variable's smallest observation and a rank of n to the largest. Taking logs before the ranking procedure is not necessary because another monotonic transformation will not change the assignment of ranks. Average ranks are used in case of ties. OLS regression is performed on the ranked data. See Iman and Conover (1979) for further details. 13. Coefficients for the intercept and fund family fixed effects were not tabulated. As presented in Tables 5 and 6 , we estimated restricted regressions [i.e., we limited the independent variables to R(%OWN) and R(NAVWGHT)] and unrestricted regressions to ensure that the significant effects we documented were not caused by a particular regression specification. For each regression, we also estimated variance inflation factors to evaluate the influence
